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Abstract 
 
The aim for this thesis is to make an analysis of entry in industries with 
differentiated products. We will attempt to achieve this task by presenting a game. 
Studying thoroughly this game will make it possible at the same time to discover a 
framework. The framework will consist of a full derivation and presentation of a 
theoretical model, as well as a numerical method. We will concentrate on the case of 
oligopolies, and develop our framework to be able to solve dynamic problems. The 
model will rest on discrete choice theory, and in order to illustrate the dynamics we 
will in our derivations make use of the Bellman equation and Markov processes. The 
firms in the industries in question will, as stated, be able to differentiate their product 
from other firms’ product. We will present two different types of industries. 
First of all industries where firms are global players, and secondly industries where 
firms are local players. With global players we mean firms that have the opportunity 
of being active in different markets at the same time. In this setup the firm 
differentiates itself from the competitors by location. The choice of which market to 
enter into will decide its location, and thus how differentiated its product will be to 
competing products. We also mentioned local players. By them we mean players 
present exclusively in one local market. These players differentiate themselves from 
competitors with the price and quality of the product. In each case we will see that the 
equilibrium is found by solving a game. The firms will maximize their value function 
and build best response functions. The first part of our thesis will concentrate on a 
static set up. This is done in order to have a foundation on which to support the 
analysis of the dynamic models. The analysis of the dynamic models, takes place in 
our second part, when we introduce the event of entry. We will present a dynamic 
model, both for the case where firms are global players and for the case where firms 
are local players. Finally, in the third part, we implement both the static model and 
the global player model and use the global player implementation to perform a 
simulation with Matlab. The simulation will attempt to shed some light on different 
issues regarding entry in the Norwegian airline industry.  
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1. Static game 
 
In this part we present a Static game. It will be based on the discussion in 
Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992). We make use of a Logit model where price 
and quality are the decision variables of the firms. We will first set up the game by 
introducing the different variables and the framework. Then we work to find the 
solution to this game and finally we prove that this solution is unique.  
 
1.1 Game setup 
 
We start our setup by creating a market with a number of consumers and firms. 
There are S consumers, and n potential firms. This market can be seen for example as 
a local retail market. The number of consumers denotes the size of the market. In this 
market we introduce the fact that firms can have different qualities on their product, 
where wi is the quality of firm i’s product. We define Ω as the set of feasible product 
qualities. This opens up the market for product differentiation. Firms in this model 
hence sets price but quality as well, and the pair price-quality are the only factors that 
consumers care about in their choice of product. Proportional to the product demand, 
we find the market share of each product and thus of each firms. The market share of 
each product is equal to the probability of that product being purchased over the 
others. We assume here a Logit density function and hence a Logit probability. 
 
(1.1)  ,    
 
where µ is the consumer preference for diversity. Making use of expression (1.1) for 
the market share of product i, the market demand for this product can be expressed. 
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(1.2) ,     
 
(1.2) is called the Logit demand system. We introduce as well firm i’s profit function. 
 
(1.3) ,   
 
θv is a parameter and represents the degree of horizontal product differentiation,  
m(wi, n) is the price-cost margin and K is the sum of all the fixed costs.  
Now that the basic expressions and variables are in place we can present the game 
at hand. We study a two-stage game. In the first stage, either the product quality is 
chosen by the potential entrants, or the potential entrant stays out. In the second stage, 
the entrants set their prices. By using backwards induction it is possible to find a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to this game. The choices made in the first stage 
affect the decisions made in the second stage. In the case where two firms select the 
same quality, these two compete à la Bertrand. If K>0, two firms choosing the same 
quality will make a loss, and hence we will not see two similar quality choices in 
equilibrium. In the following section we use our setup to solve for equilibrium prices 
and quality. 
 
1.2 Solving the game 
 
 Some derivations are needed in order to commence the analysis. We will as 
previously described, make use of backwards induction. 
 
(1.4) ,     
 
(1.5) ,     
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Having in mind that m(wi, n)=pi-ci, we try to solve for the second stage of our game. 
We thus want to find a solution for the equilibrium price. We derive our profit 
function so as to make use of the first order condition. 
 
(1.6)  
 
 
We derive once again to find the double derivative, in order to make use of the 
second order condition. 
 
(1.7)  
 
 
Setting (1.6) equal to zero, we find:  
Hence, inserting this for (1.7), we can rewrite the expression for the second order 
derivative. 
 
(1.8)  
 
 
We can from (1.8) infer that, as our profit function is concave, the solution for the 
first order condition is a maximum. We now solve the first order condition to find the 
solution of the second stage game. 
 
(1.9)      
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We continue our analysis by attempting to compute the solution of the first stage 
game. Noticing from (1.9) that our expression for the equilibrium price depends on 
the quality through Pi, we can make the following deduction. We understand that in 
our case w
*
 and p
*
(w
*
) define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all w. We 
understand as well that the equilibrium of the quality game is found for w
*
, where 
 for all wi and i=1…n. For computational reasons we 
redefine wi: wi = αqi, where α is the consumer’s valuation of quality, and qi is a 
measure of quality. α is a positive constant. Assume now that all firms choose quality 
w, except firm i who chooses quality wi.  
 
(1.10)    
 
(1.11)  , 
 
where . After some algebra it 
can be found that: 
 
(1.12) , 
 
where  is the ratio of firm i’s output to the output of any other firm. 
The expression (1.12) will be usefull later on. Let’s insert (1.10) in our expression for 
the profit. 
 
(1.13)  
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We repeat the procedure used in the second stage. The derivative of the profit 
function with respect to our measure of quality qi, will yield a solution given the first 
order condition. The sign of the second order derivative will prove whether or not this 
solution is in fact a maximum.  
 
(1.14)  
 
 
This is why the expression (1.12) is useful: It will ease the computation of the first 
derivative of the profit function. Before we attempt this derivation it is worthwhile to 
notice that the only way  is if . Hence for any result of the 
first order condition we find the following. 
 
(1.15)  
 
 
Thus the answer of  is . The second order condition will now 
tell us if this is a maximum.  
 
(1.16)  
 
We wish to compute . 
 
(1.17)  
 
 
  
10 
Again, we make use here of the fact that at a solution . The expression 
(1.16) is rewritten as below. 
 
(1.18)  
 
It is straightforward to see that the sign of  depends on the sign of 
. Differentiating (1.15) once again by qi we find the wanted result. 
 
(1.19)  
 
 
We make use once more of  since we are interested in the situation at the 
solution.  has already been found in (1.17), and is easily inserted. 
 
 
 
 
It can be concluded from this result that the solution  is a maximum. 
The analysis conducted here has brought forward an equilibrium solution for the 
quality and the price of the firms. This result is the solution of our static game. 
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1.3 Proof of uniqueness of solution 
 
 This section will have the aim of showing that the solution found in the 
preceding section is unique. We define two new variables. 
 
(1.20)     
 
(1.21)     
 
It is now possible to rewrite the solution for pi
*
. 
 
(1.22)     
     
 
It is clear that the sum of exponential functions is positive. The expression (1.22) can 
be generalized, if we replace  by a positive parameter D. ( ) 
 
(1.23)  
 
(1.24)  
 
We observe that the solution for the equilibrium price is found where the functions 
G(xi) and H(xi) are equal to each other. In other words, the equilibrium price is the 
one for which these two curves intersect. This is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of the functions G(xi) and H(xi)  
(Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992, p 265) 
 
When taking a closer look at the expressions (1.23) and (1.24), there are several 
properties for these functions that can be outlined. First of all, G(xi) is a decreasing 
linear function. It is also continuous and defined for all xi. It is worth noticing as well 
that  and . For the function H(xi), it can be 
shown to be positive as , and it is increasing and continuous in the defined 
interval . We find that , while . 
Given the information found above, it is straightforward to see that in the interval 
, there must be one and only one intersection point between the two 
functions. This proves that our equilibrium price is unique, and thus our quality 
equilibrium is unique as well. 
 
F(xi) 
xi 
H(xi) 
G(xi) 
xi(D)
) 
γi-1 ln(D) 
1 
0 
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2. Entry 
 
The short description of a static game made in the first part, will allow us to 
start analysing a more advanced framework. Adding the possibility of entry for the 
firms, or potential firms, in the market at hand, moves our analysis from a static 
perspective to a dynamic one. The dynamics are introduced as the decision of entry is 
made through time. Our aim for this part is thus to present a dynamic model of 
product differentiation with entry. The firms in this setup are once again players in a 
game. As mentioned we will present two different cases. In the first case, the firms 
will be what are called global players. By that we mean players that have the choice 
of entering several markets. The choice of which markets to enter into, will affect the 
degree of differentiation. In the second case, the firms will be local players. Here the 
firms are only present in one market and make decisions on price and product quality. 
These decisions will again affect the level of differentiation of the firm’s product 
compared to the competitor’s products. We will define the equilibrium of the game 
for both cases, and present some examples of industries or businesses that fit each 
framework. 
 
2.1 Global players 
 
As we quickly described, a set up with global players will contain several local 
markets. The decision of the firms in this case will be to choose which markets to 
enter and which to stay out from, so as to maximize its aggregate value in the current 
period and in the future. We present the global player model as it is discussed in 
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). As the time dimension is introduced so is a time 
index t. There will be n potential firms, indexed with i. The number of local markets 
is given by J. We will call these local markets outlets. In addition we have what are 
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called state variables. These describe the situation of the players and the outlets for a 
particular time period. We have both common knowledge variables and private 
information variables. The example we will use for the common knowledge variable 
is the size of the outlets. The size of the outlet is decided by the size of demand in that 
outlet. We define Sjt as our common knowledge variable in period t, for outlet j. St is 
a vector gathering each outlet size for the period t. This information is known by 
every player in the game. We will assume that the common knowledge variables are 
discrete and have a finite support.  
We have also introduced a private information variable. This variable is 
information that is only available for the firm in question. An illustration of what the 
private information variable can be is the managerial ability of each firm. 
Competitors are not expected to detain that type of information, although it affects the 
player’s wealth. We set the private information variable to be εit. Again a vector εt is 
created to collect all the firm’s private information at period t. We will assume that 
the private values are independent and identically distributed, that they do not affect 
the outcome of the common knowledge variable, and that they appear additively in 
the profit function. Both state variables follow a Markov process. A Markov process 
maps a set of outcomes for a given variable, and assigns conditional probabilities on 
each outcome occurring given that a particular outcome occurred in the last period. 
These conditional probabilities are known as transition probabilities and we write 
them as such: .  
As we mentioned, the firms make the decision of which outlet to be present in. We 
introduce ait as being the decision of firm i, at period t. ait is a vector that gathers for 
each outlet the choice of the firm at that period. Either the firm is present and , 
or the firm is not and . Each firm creates a decision rule or strategy function 
plotting the best strategy given the state variables. We set aside the time perspective 
for a moment and hence ignore the time index t. The set of decision rules are then 
given by . To complete the set up of our game we now introduce some 
expressions that will be the building blocks for what we call the Bellman equation. 
The Bellman equation describes the net present value of all current and future cash 
flow of a given firm. This equation is central as it in fact illustrates the value of the 
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firm, and is the one being maximized to find the optimal decision rule or choice 
probability. 
Our first building block is the conditional choice probabilities. The conditional 
choice probability expresses the probability of the strategy ai being chosen as the firm 
strategy given that S is common knowledge. 
 
(2.1)  
 
 is what we call an indicator function. It illustrates whether or not the element 
 is true for the subset in question.  is the density function of our 
private information variable εi. As the common knowledge variable is given, the only 
other state variable to aggregate on is the private information variable. This means 
that the choice of ai depends on the firm’s private information, and thus the 
conditional choice probability depends on the probability density of εi.  
The conditional choice probability permits us to build the current expected profit 
function, which is our second building block. This function provides us with 
information on the gains the firm can expect, when choosing a particular strategy at a 
given state. 
 
(2.2)  
 
We now take a moment to interpret the expression. We define the event t as being 
one combination of a’s for all firms except the firm in question, i. The current 
expected profit is hence the profit in event t times the probability of event t summed 
over all events t. Let’s take a look at the expression , and explain 
why that gives us the probability of one particular combination of a’s. When we were 
discussing the conditional choice probability, we observed that the choice of “a” 
depended on nothing else than the private information variable. Hence we found that 
the firm’s decision was independent of the competitor’s decision. In that case the 
conditional choice probabilities are independent between players, and that means that 
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the product of these probabilities gives us the probability that this particular 
combination of a’s is chosen.  
Our third building block is the transition probability of the common knowledge 
state variable S conditional on firm i choosing ai and the other firms following the 
decision rule. 
 
(2.3)   
 
This expression tells us the probability of  S’ occurring given that S occurred and the 
strategy ai was played by firm i. To find the transition probability of the common 
knowledge variable given that firm i plays ai, we make use of the following 
probability rule. 
 
(2.4)       
 
This is called the law of total probability (Rice, 2007). Here the transition probability 
is conditioned on a-i taking a particular value. Multiplying this conditional transition 
probability by the probability of that particular combination of a’s, and summing over 
all possible combination of a’s gives us the wanted transition probability. 
With these expressions in place the Bellman equation is ready to be introduced. As 
described earlier, this will yield the value of the firm. The Bellman equation is 
actually the maximized value of the firm; hence it presents the value of the firm given 
that it behaves optimally at all points in time, while the other firms follow the 
decision rule. 
 
(2.5)  
 
 
We clearly see that the value of the firm is composed of the sum of the current 
expected profit and the net present value of future expected income. We have β as the 
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discount factor and the function  gives us the expectation of 
the next period Bellman equation over the private information. The expectation is 
taken over the common knowledge state variable as well, as we multiply it by the 
transition probability and sum it over all feasible states. 
The setup of our game has been presented, and we now attempt to solve for the 
solution of the game. The solution in this case, will be found from the player’s best 
response probability functions or Markov reaction functions. These are based entirely 
on pay-off relevant information, and supply an optimum strategy for each state of the 
world, given the strategy of the opponents. The solution will be what is called a 
Markov perfect equilibrium, and will consist of the strategy functions that maximize 
the Bellman equation. A Markov perfect equilibrium is defined as an equilibrium in 
the Markov reaction functions. In order to find the equilibrium, we need to work on 
the Bellman equation. We are interested in another form of the Bellman equation, the 
integrated Bellman equation. 
 
(2.6)  
 
 
 
So as to simplify the analysis, we define the following expression. 
 
(2.7)  
 
We will now develop the integrated Bellman expression. To improve our 
understanding in the next steps we will study the case where there is only one market. 
This contradicts the idea of the global player set up, but it is necessary in order to 
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fully grasp what is going on. Hence ai is no longer a vector, but a number which can 
take two values: either zero or one.  
 
(2.8)  
 
Either ai=0 or ai=1 will yield the highest value, but it is unknown which one. Hence a 
best response is thus the response which maximizes the value by assigning a 
probability on each choice maximizing the expression. If we assume P
*
 is an 
equilibrium we can write the maximized Bellman as below. 
 
(2.9)  
 
 
The “max” operator vanishes as we are located at maximum, when studying an 
equilibrium. We now go back to the general notation and rewrite (2.9). 
 
(2.10)  
 
At this point we can compute the integral. 
 
(2.11)  
 
 
Here we make use of (2.7), and the fact that . We 
continue our computations on this expression, so as to be able to isolate the Bellman 
value function and thus get a solution. This will be possible since we are at 
equilibrium. The reason is that at equilibrium, the value function doesn’t vary from 
one time period to another; it is at a fixed point. In other words we could say that the 
value function is at a steady state. We thus develop our expression. 
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(2.12)  
 
 
We now insert for  from (2.3). 
 
(2.13)  
 
 
We define . 
 
(2.14)  
 
 
We define as well . 
 
(2.15)  
 
 
In vector notation, it is possible to handle the expression more easily. 
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(2.16)  
 
 
 
We define  as the solution of the system of equations, and hence the solution 
of the Bellman equation.  can hence be seen as being the expected maximized 
value of the firm, given the state variables and the strategies at hand. We observe that 
this result is not the Markov perfect equilibrium, but the solution of the system of 
Bellman equations. We will show that with this solution in hand, it is straight 
forward, to obtain the MPE from the best response probability functions. We 
therefore introduce the best response probability functions, built from our choice 
probability function in (2.1). 
 
(2.17)  
 
 
Inserting for the solution found for the Bellman equation in this expression, gives us 
the wanted Markov reaction curves. 
 
(2.18)  
 
 
The Markov perfect equilibrium is hence a fixed point originating from the Markov 
reaction curve mapping, and thus our solution is characterized. We observe that entry 
in the global player’s case depends on the competitor’s decision of entry, as 
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equilibrium is found from the junction of the Markov reaction curves. As we will 
study more extensively in the part on local players, entry in this case is also affected 
by a cost perspective. The cost of entry, in addition to other costs, is included 
implicitly in the profit function in (2.2). We haven’t discussed this perspective yet as 
the discussion of the Bellman equation was found to be intricate enough. We will also 
discover that the part on local player will bear more resemblance to our static analysis 
from part 1, than what the part on global players does. 
Before moving on to the discussion of local players, we will go through some 
examples of industries with global players, show what defines the players of these 
industries as global players, and thus show why these industries fit our setup.  
Let’s take a look at the airline industry; it will be our first example. An airline 
company delivers services, such as transporting cargo or people, within or beyond a 
country’s borders. As we have seen, an airline company will be a global player if it is 
present in several local markets. The key question in this case is what defines a 
market in this industry? Usually a market is seen as being a part of a city, a city, a 
region, or a country. Is this the case for the airline industry? An airline company 
offers transport from one city to another. But will the market be defined by the city of 
departure or the city of arrival? Actually, we can assume that neither is the case. As 
the demand is for transport between two cities, a city pair can be viewed as a local 
market in this case. The choice of which route to serve, determines which markets the 
airline company enters into. Whenever a company serves more than one route it is a 
global player. The cities vary in size and hence the demand for each route varies from 
one another. Adding for differences in demand between seasons, we can note that one 
route may experience changes in demand depending on time. Such changes in 
demand can also happen as a result of the economical climate. This fits well with our 
game set-up where the state variable changes from one time period to another through 
the Markov process. We can also assume that whenever an airline company changes 
its managers, the managerial abilities vary. It is clear as well that in the airline 
industry, which is very competitive, the choice of entry of one actor to a particular 
market, will affect the choice of entry of the competitors to the same market. This as 
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well is in line with our model. The two main players in the Norwegian airline 
industry are Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and Norwegian. 
The supermarket industry is another example of an industry with global players. 
When visiting a supermarket, we often notice that the name or/and concept of the 
supermarket is identical to other supermarkets in the same city, region or country. 
The reason is that this supermarket belongs to a chain. The main examples of 
supermarket chains in Norway are Norgesgruppen, Coop Norge, ICA Norge, and 
Reitangruppen. They own several supermarket brands, which have stores all over the 
country. In this case, unlike the airline industry, markets are small local areas. These 
local areas can be neighborhoods or communities in a town or city, or small districts. 
Here as well the choice of where to enter is crucial for the division of the market 
share, and thus for the profit. The choice of entry will, as in our model, depend on the 
market sizes and the choice of the competitors. Similarly to the airline industry it is 
reasonable to assume that, due to management changes and changes in the 
economical climate, both the managerial ability and the market sizes can be modeled 
with a Markov process. 
 
2.2 Local players 
 
Since the model for local players is a dynamic one, some of the analysis in this 
part will resemble that of the global player part. The main resemblance will be the use 
of the Bellman equation. Taking a closer look we will see that the two models are 
very different. The local player set up studies, as we mentioned earlier, several firms 
in one local market. Hence the firms must make the decision of being present or not 
in each time period, for that market only. We use the analysis in Aguirregabiria, Mira 
and Roman (2007) as well as Aguirregabiria, Mira and Roman (2005) to model this 
case. We will introduce a cost structure, and hence the profit functions of the firms 
will differ whether they are inactive, entering, incumbent or exiting. In the static 
game part, the central issues were the decision of quality and price. This will also be a 
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central issue in this part. As we move to a dynamic setup compared to the first part, 
investment costs will appear. These will able the firms to affect the quality level. We 
start the presentation of the model. We index time again by t, and firms by i. There 
are nt potential firms and St consumers. The number of consumers determines the 
market size and evolves following a Markov process. We define  as the 
transition probability of the Markov process for the market size. Of the potential 
firms we have Nt active or incumbent firms. The remaining  firms are 
potential entrants. We denote  to be the quality, and  to be the price variable of 
firm i at time t. We introduce the market share and variable profit functions. These 
are similar to the static game, but they vary each period. 
 
(2.19)  ,    
 
(2.20)  
 
We remember that  is the probability of firm i being chosen by the consumers 
given that he achieves quality , and sets price .  is the Logit probability from 
discrete choice theory.  is as before the horizontal product differentiation 
parameter. We recall as well  which we defined as the price-cost margin. 
In other words it’s the mark-up firms take. The firms earn this variable profit, as long 
as they are active in the market. The quality follows as well a Markov process, but 
can be affected by investments. The transition probability is given by 
, where  denotes the investment decision of firm i at period t.  
takes either the value one or zero, where one indicates the firm invests, while zero 
signifies it doesn’t. The transition probability function for the quality parameter has 
the following properties. 
 
(2.21) ,    
 
  
24 
(2.22) ,    
 
The first property states that without any investment, the quality cannot improve. 
The second property states that with a positive investment, the quality cannot 
depreciate. In relation to the investment decision, we introduce a parameter that is 
firm-specific. This parameter  indicates how expensive the investment cost is for 
the firm in question. This parameter, as well as the initial quality, is drawn from a 
given probability distribution for each firm. The game allows the firms to exit from 
the market, but once a firm exits it isn’t allowed to enter again. Each period the 
exiting firms disappear from the game and new players appear. The pool of potential 
entrants is thus updated. The new players must make their decision of whether to 
enter or not before they have information about the initial quality and the investment 
cost parameter. Once a firm enters the market, it competes in prices with the other 
active firms in a Bertrand manner.  
We will now take a moment to describe the profit function. The form of the profit 
function depends on the firm’s decision. There are four different profit functions. In 
the case where the firm decides to stay out of the market, the profit is zero. Next if an 
inactive firm decides to enter his profit is as follows. 
 
(2.23)  
 
The entire profit is composed of the entry cost , where . First 
we have  which is the firm-specific part of the entry cost. It is also private 
information. On the other hand we have  which is the part of the entry cost 
common for all firms. We move over to the case where an already active firm decides 
to stay in the market. We present the profit function in this case. 
 
(2.24)  
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As we have already mentioned, every period the firm i is active, it earns the variable 
profit. Each period it is present in the market it must also pay fixed costs  and 
investment costs . The fixed cost has the form presented below. 
 
(2.25)  
 
The interpretation is similar to the entry cost. We have a common component, and a 
firm-specific one.  is the fixed cost common for all active firms, while  
is the fixed cost specific to firm i. We assume as we can see that the fixed cost 
depends on the level of quality. The higher  is, the harder it is for a firm to 
sustain a high level of quality. We have an expression as well for the investment cost. 
 
(2.26)  
 
We recall that . Again,  is the common part of the investment cost. The 
firm-specific part of the investment is the expression , where  is a 
parameter while  is the type of the firm. The lower  is, the more the firm has a 
propensity to invest.  is a private information variable. Lastly we present the profit 
function in the case where firm i decides to exit from the market. 
 
(2.27)  
 
Where  is the exit value, meaning the income from terminating operations. This 
can be from selling the assets of the firm for example. The exit value or scrap value 
of the firm i is expressed accordingly. 
 
(2.28)  
 
Here again, we defined  as being the part of the exit value common for all firms, 
while  is specific for each firm. We observe that the quality is related 
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to the exit value. We can assume that the more we spend on quality investment, the 
more the production processes become advanced and the higher we can expect the 
scrap value of being when these processes are sold. We have depicted the different 
forms the profit function can take depending on the choice of the firm in question. 
We will in a moment work with the Bellman equation and the intertemporal value 
of the firm. We define first the state variables and decision variables of the firm. The 
state variables are the quality , the market size , the number of incumbent firms 
, and the vector of firm-specific variables . The firm-specific variables are taken 
from the cost structure studied above.  
 
(2.29)  
 
We assume they are standard normally distributed. The decision variables of the 
firms are the price  and the decision  of investing in quality or not. The firms 
must also, as we have seen, make the decision of staying or exiting the market if they 
are incumbent, and make the decision of staying out or entering the market if they are 
potential entrants. We study the case of an incumbent firm.  
 
(2.30)  
 
 
The value or the income stream of firm i is given by the expression stated above. 
Whatever the choice taken by the incumbent, he will always earn the proceeds from 
being active and he will need to pay the fixed cost. As we can see, his choice will be 
the action that yields the highest expected flow of income. From the top, we find that 
he can either, stay in the market and invest in quality, stay in the market without 
investing or exit the market. If he decides to stay and invest, he must pay the 
investment cost, but earns the flow of income from subsequent periods given that he 
has invested in this period. If he decides to stay without investing, he needn’t pay the 
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investment cost and he earns the flow of income from subsequent periods given that 
he has made no investment this period. If he exits the market, he only receives the 
exit value. The expected flow of income  from subsequent periods 
is defined by the next expression. 
 
(2.31)  
 
 
We notice how we have aggregated over all relevant state variables. In equation 
(2.30) we integrate over the two private information variables. In equation (2.31) we 
sum over the occurrences of quality, number of active firms and market size. We 
introduce as well  which is the expected transition probability of the 
number of incumbents. This transition tells us how many incumbents we can expect 
the next period, given that the number of incumbent and market size this period are 
respectively  and .  is our discount factor. We have presented and studied the 
value function of an incumbent firm and we are now interested in the value function 
of an entering firm. A potential entrant enters into the market as long as the value of 
entering is higher than the value of staying out. This is found to be the case when 
. We define  as being the expected future flow 
of income for the entrant. It is described by the following expression. 
 
(2.32)  
 
 
 refers to the first draw of quality. The entering firm earns, as we recall, 
nothing in the period at hand and thus the entrant’s income is discounted directly.  
We are now ready to compute the choice probability functions. In other words we 
wish to find the probabilities that the firms choose either one of the strategies that we 
have presented. We will start by computing the probability that an incumbent firm i 
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stays in the market without investing. Two conditions are required for this event to 
occur. First of all, the value of the firm in that case must be higher or equal to the 
value it achieves from exiting the market. Secondly, the value of the firm in that case 
must be higher or equal to the value it obtains from staying in the market and 
investing. Finding the probability of this event occurring, boils down to finding the 
probability that these two conditions are satisfied at the same time. As the shocks in 
cost  and , have a standard normal distribution, we will be able to use the joint 
normal distribution to this end. Before we compute the probability we must express 
the two conditions. 
 
(2.33)  
 
 
 
(2.34)  
 
 
 
 The inequality (2.33) expresses the case where staying in the market without 
investing is preferred to exiting the market. The inequality (2.34) expresses the case 
where staying in the market without investing is preferred to staying in the market 
and investing. With these two points found for  and , the joint standard 
normal distribution is now applied. The cumulative distribution function, at these 
values, and for correlation value , produces the probability that an incumbent stays 
in the market without investing. 
 
(2.35)  
 
We repeat the same procedure for the probability that an incumbent firm i stays and 
invests. We find again two conditions for this to happen. The value of the firm in that 
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case must be higher or equal to the value from exiting. At the same time, the value of 
the firm in that case must be higher or equal to the value it yields from staying 
without investing. We express these events in (2.36) and (2.37) respectively. 
 
(2.36)  
 
 
 
(2.37)  
 
 
 
The joint standard normal distribution can again be used. This is because the 
difference between two standard normally distributed variables is as well normally 
distributed. The mean of  is found to be zero and the variance is computed 
below. 
 
(2.38)  
 
 
We repeat the reasoning and find the probability that an incumbent stays in the 
market and invests. 
 
(2.39)  
 
With the two probabilities  and  at hand, we can easily find the probability  
that an incumbent firm i decides to exit. The reason is that the incumbent has three 
alternatives. If he doesn’t choose the two first, he is bound to choose the last. We 
infer from this argument the probability that an incumbent exits. 
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(2.40)  
 
We are interested in one last probability, and that is the probability  of a potential 
entrant entering the market. As we have already seen, the potential entrant enters only 
if one particular condition is satisfied. The value of entering must be higher than the 
value of the alternative of staying out. 
 
(2.41)  
 
 
It is straight forward to apply the standard normal cumulative distribution function at 
this point to form the wanted probability.  
 
(2.42)  
 
Our last step is to find the equilibrium transition probability for the number of 
incumbents. In other words we wish to solve for . The number of 
incumbents at a period of time is dependent on three elements. First of all, obviously 
it is dependent on the number of incumbents in the previous period. Furthermore it is 
dependent on one hand the number of entrants and on the other hand the number of 
exits in that period. We have taken some time to compute the probability  that an 
incumbent firm i exits, and the probability  that a potential entrant enters. This will 
be useful as we can use them to find first of all the conditional probability 
 that the number of entrants is e given the number of potential entrants 
and . We will also be able to compute the conditional probability  that 
the number of exits is x given the number of incumbents and . We will assume the 
probability density function  is from the binomial distribution. In turn the 
conditional probabilities for the values of e and x will help build the following 
expression. 
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(2.43)  
 
 
Given that we know the value of  in period t and together with the expected values 
for e and x we will compute the expected value for . We will rapidly go through 
the explanation of the binomial distribution as discussed in the literature (Rice, 2007) 
and study the way it is used here. We take the case of the number of entrants e. 
 
(2.44)  
 
By  we find the probability that a selection of players e choose to enter, while by 
 we find the probability that the remaining players choose to stay out.  
Therefore the element  gives us the probability that a particular 
selection or combination of potential entrants actually enters. The number of 
combinations by which we get that e players enters from a pool of  potential 
entrants is given by . We end up as we can see with , that pictures the 
probability that the number of entrants is e. The binomial distribution fits this setup 
perfectly as the potential entrant is standing before two alternatives, entering or 
staying out. The binomial distribution is used as well for determining  as 
the incumbent has the choice between staying and exiting.  
Similarly to the analysis in the global player part, the collection of choice 
probability functions, the value functions and the transition probability for the 
number of incumbents creates a fixed point mapping . The fixed point 
mapping determines an equilibrium in the probability function . The 
equilibrium is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, as all the player’s decisions are based 
only on pay-off relevant information. We define the equilibrium as . The solution 
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of the model has been described, and we use the rest of this section to present several 
examples of industries that fit the local player setup.  
Our first example is the restaurant business. Unless we study the case of a 
restaurant chain, a restaurant is located in one single local market. In large cities the 
competition is often very hard between restaurants and the market suffers many 
bankruptcies and exits. But simultaneously we often observe that there are many 
potential entrants, ready to take over some share of the same market. The turnover in 
those cases is high. When a restaurant is opened, many decisions must be made. One 
of the first choices is what market segment the restaurant wishes to serve. The choice 
of market segment imposes the restaurant to invest accordingly in quality. It needs to 
invest in the food, the staff and the interior among other things. With the market 
segment in place the restaurant is able to make the choice of the price level. It is 
reasonable to assume that the restaurant considers the market size and the number of 
incumbents to be state variables. Similarly the given managerial abilities determine 
the differences in cost structure between restaurants. Finally we can also assume that 
quality is a state of nature affected by investment. The reason is that quality is 
decided by the public. The consumer’s taste determines whether a restaurant is 
perceived as good or bad. As we can see, the interpretation of the restaurant sector 
fits nicely to the local player model presented earlier. Other examples of businesses 
that can be used in this framework are plumbers, electricians and local doctors.  
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3. Implementation 
 
In the preceding sections, several models have been presented. In the first part, a 
static model was brought forward. In the second part, dynamic models were 
presented, as we introduced the event of entry of both global players and local 
players. In order to see how these models can be used, this part will focus on some 
applications, and present numerical methods which can be used to solve the models. 
We will concentrate on the global player model, although we display as well an 
application for the static game presented earlier. The application presented here for 
the static game could be extended as well to the local player framework. We will 
finally attempt towards the end to simulate the application of the global player model. 
This simulation will be inspired by the Norwegian airline industry. 
 
3.1 An outside alternative 
 
The discussion in this section will be built upon the analysis in Aguirregabiria, 
Mira and Roman (2005). The first setup will add a new assumption in the static game 
presented in the first part. In addition to be able to choose between the products of 
different firms, the consumer will now have a new option. This option is that of the 
outside alternative. The outside alternative can, for example, be interpreted as the 
choice of not purchasing any product at all. Our consumer will now hence be able to 
choose not to purchase anything. We assume that the consumer has a reservation 
utility, in other words that the consumer earns something even when she doesn’t 
purchase anything. We introduce the consumer’s indirect utility of purchasing from 
firm i. 
 
(3.1)  
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Again, wi is the quality of retailer i, pi his price, and vi is what is called the 
consumer’s idiosyncratic taste. This variable is the consumer’s preference for firm i, 
independent of the firm’s price and quality. It describes the degree of horizontal 
product differentiation in the market. We assume that the vi’s are independently and 
identically distributed, and are extreme value distributed. The outside alternative is 
defined for i=0, and the indirect utility of this option is .  
We are now interested as in the first part, to compute the probability of a consumer 
purchasing the product of retailer i. A consumer will purchase from firm i, if the 
utility he derives from firm i is at least equal to the utility he derives from all the 
other options. The other options are either purchase from any other competitor, or not 
purchase anything. Hence we find that the probability of a consumer purchasing the 
product of retailer i is the probability that   for all 
, where n is the number of retailers in the market. With this starting point, it 
is possible to find an expression for the probability. 
 
(3.2)   
 
 
Let the mark-up be defined as  and the cost-adjusted quality be 
defined as . From the first part, we know that the demand is 
given by . With this information in place, an expression for the demand is 
computed easily. 
 
(3.3)       
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As the setup is static here, we set aside the matter of entry and are thus interested only 
in cases where the firms are present in the market for the period in question. This 
said, the profit function has the following form. 
 
(3.4)     
 
Each retailer, present in the market, will hence choose a mark-up which will 
maximize his profit.  
A best response function exists for each firm, which expresses the optimal mark-up 
level for the firm in question, as a function of the other firm’s mark-up. The system of 
best response function defines the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. In order to find the 
best response functions, we first need to maximize the profit function. From the 
analysis in the first part, we know that the solution to the first order condition will 
yield a maximum. Hence we directly find the first order condition. 
 
(3.5)  
 
 
 
 
The last equation is the expression for the best response of retailer i. From the system 
of equations consisting of all the best response functions, we have n equations, with n 
unknowns. It is thus possible to solve for the equilibrium price-cost margin. When the 
equilibrium price-cost margin is known, the equilibrium price is revealed as well. We 
can show how to solve for the mark-up numerically, simply by taking the case of a 
market with two retailers. By using the software Matlab, it is possible to use what is 
called the Newton method to find the root of a function. When finding the roots  to 
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the functions  (for i=1,2), we find at the same time the equilibrium price-
cost margin from the best response functions. 
 
3.2 Cournot competition 
 
This second setup takes a closer look at the global player model from the second 
part. To demonstrate one implementation of the model, we will introduce the 
assumption that in each local market, firms compete à la Cournot. This is also treated 
in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). With Cournot competition firms compete in 
quantity rather than price. Hence for each market where more than one player is 
present, the firms will compete as such. As we will see in a moment this will give a 
particular form to the profit function. We will start by rapidly going through the 
Cournot analysis as discussed in the litterature (Tirole, 1982, p 218-221). We assume 
that there are N firms active in the market in question, they are indexed by i. They 
each choose a quantity qit to produce of the good, which then determines the total 
quantity Qt, of the good available in that market at period t. This supply, together with 
the market size, determines the actual price of the good. This is described by the 
following expression. 
 
(3.6)  
 
We notice that the higher the supply, the lower we can expect the price to be. 
Equivalently, the higher the market size St, the higher will the price be. This is 
explained by the fact that demand increases with market size. We now move over to 
the study of the profit function. We define the marginal cost as c, which we assume is 
identical for all firms. We state firm i’s variable profit, which we know from standard 
economical theory can be written . It is clear that firm i 
makes his decision of which quantity to choose based on the maximization of this 
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expression. To proceed we need to perform this task. We compute the first order 
condition.  
 
(3.7)  
 
We see directly here that the second order condition becomes , 
which is negative. Thus the solution for qit is a maximum. For the case of a 
symmetric Cournot solution, all firms will produce the same quantity. We will have 
, and . We rewrite (3.7). 
 
(3.8)  
 
 
We can use this solution to solve for the price and the profit function. Inserting for  
in (3.6), we get the solution for the price. 
 
(3.9)  
 
 
 
At this point we concentrate on the profit. As we recall the variable profit was given 
by . We notice that both  and  have been found and can 
therefore be inserted directly to this expression. 
 
(3.10)  
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We define , which corresponds to  in the static model. It represents the 
marginal transportation cost or in other words the degree of horizontal product 
differentiation. The Cournot analysis has been completed, and the variable profit 
found. 
How can we implement this way of thinking into the model for global player? The 
profit function  from part two reveals that it is dependent on two things. 
Just as with the Cournot analysis, the profit is first of all dependent on the market 
size. But the profit is as well dependent on the choice of the firm’s a. At first glance 
this might appear different from the Cournot profit, but in fact it isn’t. For the market 
in question, the decision of being present or not that each firm face will actually give 
us the precise number of active firms when we aggregate this decision over all firms. 
This is because ai takes only two values as we have already seen; either zero if firm i 
decides to be inactive, or one if it decides to be active in that particular market. From 
the discussion above, we can therefore state that . Hence we note that 
there is a large difference between the number of potential firms (n), and the number 
of active firms (N). Assuming firm i is active, we can rewrite our variable profit as 
below. 
 
(3.11)  
 
 
For the case where firm i is inactive, the profit is assumed to be zero, thus we find 
. We now have our variable profit, and for the profit function to be 
complete, we need to incorporate the cost structure and the private information 
variable. This is our next step.  
 
(3.12)  
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 is firm i’s fixed cost,  is the private information variable introduced in part 
two, and  is the entry cost for the case where firm i wasn’t active in 
this market in the previous period. As we can see this element disappears if  
equals to one, hence if firm i actually was active in the previous period.  
The method presented to solve the global player model in the second part, was a 
general method which can be replicated to solve more specific problems. This is 
exactly what we will attempt here using our newly found profit function from a 
Cournot analysis. Before we start, we make one new assumption. The private 
information variables are normally distributed with zero means. As we will see in a 
moment, our interest will be on the difference between these two private information 
variables. We place as well the following definition: . We 
will now see why this difference is useful. A firm is active in a particular market if 
and only if, the value he gets from actually being active is higher then the value he 
gets from staying out. It’s the decision which maximizes the expression (2.18) that is 
chosen. With this in mind we express our next condition.  
 
(3.13)  
 
 
 
A firm is thus active if and only if (3.13) holds. We know from our initial 
assumption that . Using the cumulative distribution 
function for the normal distribution we are able to find the probability that a firm 
actually will be active.  
 
(3.14)  
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In order to work with the model we need to introduce a few more building blocks. 
The next element we wish to present will be particularly central when we move over 
to the simulations using Matlab. This expression will give us what we can call a total 
transition probability. Given the market size from the previous period, the actions 
chosen by each firm in the previous period, and given that firm i plays ai, this 
function will yield the probability that a particular combination of actions and market 
size occurs. 
 
(3.15)  
 
 
In this expression, we assume that the different actors in the market are independent, 
and that they do not collude. The probability that two independent events occur is 
defined as the product of the probability of each event: . 
Hence we recognize from (3.15) the probability that the competitors of firm i each 
choose one particular action.  
 
(3.16)   
 
Our last building block is the current expected profit function. This is, as we see 
below, constructed with our profit function from (3.12), and corresponds to the model 
from part two. 
 
(3.17)  
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The building blocks are in place, and we will now work to simplify the notation 
using vector notation. From that point, a solution will be characterized. We define to 
ease the notation: . We now introduce several vectors. 
 
(3.18)  
 
(3.19)  
 
(3.20)  
 
We note that  is a  row vector with values zero, except for column i, which 
has value one. With these tools we are now able to rewrite  and  in 
vector form. 
 
(3.21)  
 
(3.22)  
 
Let’s recall the expression (2.16) we had for the Bellman equation in vector notation 
from part two: . Continuing our 
analysis we observe that we can make some modifications.  
 
(3.23)  
 
(3.24)  
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(3.25)  
 
The last expression (3.25) will be proven in the appendix. From what is stated above, 
we can perform the following rewriting. 
 
(3.26)  
 
We are now ready to express the solution system to the value function of the 
Bellman equation. This is again based on expression (2.16), and the method presented 
in part two.  
 
(3.27)  
 
 
We deduce from (3.27) that  and  are defined by the following 
expressions. 
 
(3.28)  
 
(3.29)  
 
Proceeding with the method from the global player model, we remember that there 
is one last step in characterizing the solution of the model. That is computing the best 
response probability functions or in other words the Markov reaction functions. From 
our previous analysis, we have in (3.14) an expression for this best response 
probability. We take a moment to study it. 
 
(3.30)  
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As , the next step is inferred. 
 
 
 
 
 
Here our best response probability function has taken shape, and we see clearly from 
the last step the definition of  and . 
 
(3.31)  
 
(3.32)  
 
Our application for the global player is complete. We have shown that it is possible 
to implement this model, so as to fit a set up with firms competing in each local 
market in a Cournot manner. This was done to give an example of a possible use for 
this model, and to demonstrate its scope. In the next section, our main interest will be 
the numerical way of solving this model. As we have already mentioned, the software 
program Matlab can help us with this task. 
  
44 
 
3.3 A numerical analysis 
 
This section will consist of two elements. First of all, we will go through the 
procedure used to solve the global player model in Matlab. We will explain how the 
procedure brings us a solution. Then we will present some questions that are related 
to the theory, and use our program to attempt to answer them. The algorithm to the 
global player model can be found in the appendix.  
Matlab enables us to create different loops. They make it possible to picture all the 
different events that are feasible, and permit us to work with them. By events we 
mean combinations of state variables and actions taken by the different players at 
different points in time. From an initial position, we are able with the program to 
determine and give form to unknown expressions. This will be the case for the 
Bellman value function as we will see in a moment. We will take some time and 
present the different elements needed to run the program. These are taken directly 
from the model. We will have different transition probabilities, the profit functions 
and the Bellman equation. We start by putting in place the different relevant 
transition probabilities in our program. Given , the probability of each firm 
choosing a particular action given a particular state of nature, we build  
and . The first expression yields the probability of a particular 
combination of actions occurring, conditioned on the fact that we are in a specific 
state and that a given combination of actions occurred in the previous period. The last 
expression is the expression we presented in (3.15). This expression yields the 
transition probability from one state and one set of actions given that the choice of 
firm i is ai, to the next period’s state and set of actions. In other words, with these 
probabilities in place we manage to map the set of outcomes and the transition 
between them from one time period to another. Furthermore we build both the profit 
function  and the value function  for each firm. The profit function 
will be a log-linear version of the current expected profit computed in the previous 
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part. Hence it will be based on the expression (3.17). The value function is nothing 
else than the intertemporal income stream of a firm. It will have the following form. 
 
(3.33)  
 
 
With the proper code, the program will take this value function and start to iterate it 
from an initial point. For each iteration, or time period, the profit and the transition 
probability will be updated. Each single iteration will, thus bring a suggestion for the 
solution to the value function. The iterations will stop once the solutions from one 
time period to the next become similar enough. The convergence criterion will decide 
what is meant by similar enough. The output produced is our solution for the model. 
We will try to explain why this is the case. We have seen in our analysis of the 
second part that it is possible at equilibrium to isolate the value function. The reason 
was that the equilibrium is a fixed point. The time aspect disappears and so does the 
variation in the value function. The value function become identical on each side of 
the equality and with some algebra we can solve for it. This was shown thoroughly in 
part two. What is done in Matlab is actually to work recursively. Since we know that 
at equilibrium the value functions are identical, we only need to get to the point 
where the value functions are close enough to know that we are approximately at 
equilibrium. We have presented the method and will now try to make use of it to 
answer several questions. 
We will consider the airline industry in Norway, concentrating on domestic flights. 
We have mentioned earlier that there are two competitors, SAS and Norwegian. SAS 
is a large airline focusing on quality and diversity of destination, while Norwegian is 
a relatively new, low-price airline focusing on cheap flights on the largest markets. 
We focus on the routes that are considered as the main routes by TØI, the Norwegian 
Institute of Transport Economics. These are presented in Table 3.1 below. We retain 
hence these nineteen markets for our simulation. We see from this table that the 
market share is higher for SAS in all the city-pairs in question. To be able to express 
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this difference in market shares in our simulation, we make the assumption that 
Norwegian has a higher fixed cost than SAS.  
 
 
    Number of frequencies per week Passengers Seats Norwegian's share of the: 
Route Norwegian SAS Total (in 1000) (in 1000) Frequencies Traffic 
Oslo-Bergen* 68 104 172 1632 2276 41 44 
Oslo-Trondheim* 68 97 165 1624 2190 41 44 
Oslo-Stavanger* 48 87 135 1241 1868 36 38 
Bergen-Stavanger* 18 67 85 556 1097 27 37 
Oslo-Tromsø* 19 52 71 775 1110 30 36 
Oslo-Bodø* 18 44 62 635 867 41 35 
Bergen-Trondheim* 10 44 54 380 632 40 43 
Oslo-Ålesund 0 49 49 469 649 0 0 
Oslo-Kristiansand 0 48 48 406 632 0 0 
Oslo-Harstad/Narvik* 13 28 41 438 548 41 38 
Bergen-Sandefjord 0 39 39 125 205 0 0 
Kristiansand-Bergen 0 38 38 128 174 0 0 
Tromsø-Bodø 0 36 36 168 392 0 0 
Oslo-Haugesund 0 35 35 399 471 0 0 
Oslo-Molde 0 32 32 268 408 0 0 
Oslo-Kristiansund 0 30 30 158 259 0 0 
Oslo-Bardufoss* 0 19 19 173 270 0 0 
Oslo-Alta* 7 12 19 213 295 38 41 
Oslo-Kirkeness 0 13 13 135 259 0 0 
TØI report 974/2008 
       * Routes with competition in 2007 
      Table 3.1: Frequency and traffic on main routes by airline in 2007 
 
We are now ready to study several issues. Our aim is to use our framework defined 
by the global player model and the program, to attempt answering those issues within 
the context of the Norwegian airline industry. Our first question is in what way 
product differentiation affects the choice of entry and the degree of turnover. We also 
wish to find out how the size of the entry cost affects the degree of entry and 
turnover. Our last goal is to pinpoint the different effects from the arrival of a new 
entrant. For the measure of entry cost we use the parameter . The measure of 
product differentiation will be a version of the unit transportation cost , from the 
profit function in the Cournot analysis. When moving over to the log-linear form of 
the profit function, the parameters are rearranged, and  is replaced by a parameter 
that we will call . We will not proceed with the computations of the log linear 
profit as it does not enhance our understanding.  is similar to  in that it 
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represents the degree of horizontal product differentiation. But  differs from , 
in that higher  is translated by a lower degree of horizontal product 
differentiation, while by higher  we mean more product differentiation. We present 
the results from the simulations in Table 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Exp.1 
θEC=1 
θRN=0 
Exp.2 
θEC=1 
θRN=1 
Exp.3 
θEC=1 
θRN=2 
Exp.4 
θEC=0 
θRN=1 
Exp.5 
θEC=2 
θRN=1 
Exp.6 
θEC=4 
θRN=1 
Number of firms 
      Mean 1,4211 1,4737 1,0526 1,3684 1,3684 1,0000 
Std. Dev. 0,8377 0,6967 0,7799 0,8307 0,7609 0,8165 
Number of entrants 
      Mean 0,2105 0,2632 0,4211 0,2105 0,2105 0,1053 
Number of exits 
      Mean 0,3158 0,1579 0,3684 0,4211 0,1053 0,1053 
Excess Turnover 0,4210 0,3158 0,7368 0,4210 0,2106 0,2106 
Correlation between entries and exits 0,2745 -0,2588 -0,2094 -0,1170 -0,1771 -0,1176 
Probability of being active 
      SAS 0,6842 0,7895 0,5789 0,7368 0,7895 0,6316 
Norwegian 0,7368 0,6842 0,4737 0,6316 0,5789 0,3684 
Table 3.2: Results for simulation with volatile entry cost and product differentiation 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Exp.1 
θEC=1 
θRN=1 
Exp.2 
θEC=1 
θRN=1 
Exp.3 
θEC=0 
θRN=1 
Exp.4 
θEC=0 
θRN=1 
Exp.5 
θEC=1 
θRN=0 
Exp.6 
θEC=1 
θRN=0 
Number of players 2 3 2 3 2 3 
Number of firms 
      Mean 1,4737 1,8947 1,3684 1,9474 1,4211 2,0000 
Std. Dev. 0,6967 0,9941 0,8307 0,9113 0,8377 1,1055 
Number of entrants 
      Mean 0,2632 0,3158 0,2105 0,6316 0,2105 0,0526 
Number of exits 
      Mean 0,1579 0,4211 0,4211 0,5263 0,3158 0,3684 
Excess Turnover 0,3158 0,6316 0,4210 1,0526 0,4210 0,1052 
Correlation between entries and 
exits 
-
0,2588 0,0908 -0,1170 -0,2700 -0,2745 -0,1494 
Probability of being active 
      SAS 0,7895 0,6842 0,7368 0,8421 0,6842 0,7895 
Norwegian 0,6842 0,6842 0,6316 0,4737 0,7368 0,5263 
Entrant N/A 0,5263 N/A 0,6316 N/A 0,6842 
Table 3.3: Results for simulation with the arrival of a new entrant 
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Each experiment consists of 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations, and the turnover statistic 
is computed as follows. Turnover = Entry+Exit-abs(Entry-Exit). For the entry and 
exit values in this computation, we use the mean values from the simulation.  
We will start interpreting the results from Table 3.2, which are linked to the two 
first issues raised. The first issue is, as we know, the effect on entry and turnover of 
altered product differentiation. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 concentrate on the effect of 
product differentiation, by holding the entry cost constant and steadily increasing θRN. 
In other words we see what happens when the degree of product differentiation 
decreases. We can observe several effects. Less product differentiation seems to lead 
to less active firms. This can be interpreted as follows. When a firm has less room to 
differentiate itself from other firms, it must resort to fiercer competition in order to 
attract demand. Fiercer competition leaves the firms with tighter profit, and thus they 
are only able to stay active in fewer outlets. We notice as well that the number of 
entrants and the number of exits increase as the degree of product differentiation 
decreases. As a result, we observe as well a higher level of turnover in the industry. 
This is also caused by more aggressive competition. As the level of product 
differentiation decreases, we know that the firms will be more similar as the quality 
converges, and that prices will be pushed down. As some inefficient outlets are 
dropped by the different firms, new ones may be found and entered into. With fiercer 
competition it is necessarily harder to deter entry in local markets with price cuts. 
We move over to our interpretation of experiments 4, 5 and 6. These experiments 
illustrate the effect of variation in the entry cost. This time we keep the level of 
product differentiation constant. The first remark we can make is that higher entry 
cost seems to limit the number of active firms. The reason is that, an increase in entry 
cost gives a higher total fixed cost. When this is the case we can assume that fewer 
firms are efficient enough to be active. We observe that higher entry cost reduces 
entry in the different outlets. This relationship is straight forward. In the same way a 
higher price restrains consumption, a higher entry cost restrains entry. The level of 
exit is also reduced because of higher entry cost. The explanation is that, as it 
becomes more expensive to enter new local markets, the players limit expenditure by 
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holding on to the outlets they already serve. With both fewer entrants and fewer exits, 
we necessarily find a lower degree of turnover. We finally notice that we have 
succeeded in picturing SAS as a larger player. By this we refer to the fact that 
Scandinavian airline’s probability of being active is systematically higher for nearly 
all studied cases.  
Let’s study what happens when a new player enters the game. This is depicted in 
Table 3.3. For the simulation, we have chosen an entrant with similar cost structure 
than Norwegian. We have chosen approximately the same level of fixed cost. In other 
words, we can expect the new entrant to be in more direct competition to Norwegian 
than with SAS. This seems to be confirmed when we compare Norwegian’s 
probability of being active before and after the new player’s entry in the game. 
Norwegian seems to stand less of a chance of remaining active in the different outlets 
as the entrant appears. SAS on the other hand gets a higher probability of being active 
in two out of the three cases. With the arrival of a new player, the number of entrants 
for the different outlets rises as well in two out of the three cases, and the number of 
exits rises in all cases. This is attributed to the higher level of competition reached 
from more competitors. In the two cases where both entry and exit numbers are rising 
the turnover rate is rising as well. We realize that a few of the numbers are in conflict 
with the interpretations we have presented, and point to the fact that, for simplifying 
reasons we have chosen only nineteen outlets. Taking into account more city pairs in 
our analysis would enlarge the number of observations, and we can assume that the 
results would then be more consistent. This concludes our interpretation, and hence 
our simulation section. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
We have gone through the study of a static game of product differentiation, as 
well as dynamic entry models with product differentiation. In our analysis we have 
distinguished between dynamic models with global and local players. Furthermore 
we have implemented the static model, as well as the global player model, to get an 
idea of how these models can be used. Finally we have attempted a simulation of the 
global player model, inspired by the Norwegian airline industry. The simulation 
produced some output, which was discussed in-depth. Based on the results we were 
able to analyze different issues regarding the relationship between entry, turnover, 
product differentiation and entry costs. We analyzed as well the arrival of a new 
airline into the market of domestic flights in Norway. 
We have shown how this framework can be used to study a particular industry. In 
the same way we simulated the airline industry, we could have used the same 
framework to analyze the supermarket industry. But there are some limits to the 
framework presented here, and the limits indicate how this model can be extended. 
One of these limits was the way we pictured the higher market share Scandinavian 
airlines enjoys in the industry. To underline that fact, we allowed SAS to have a 
lower level of fixed cost. But the model would be closer to reality if we introduced a 
measure of market power in our analysis. One way would be to use an average of the 
frequencies of offered flights on all routes in question. A second suggestion would be 
to compute market shares based on the airline’s share of commuters. 
We observe yet another limit, and that is how we model the different outlets. In our 
analysis and our simulation, all the nineteen local markets are assumed to have 
identical transition probability for the market sizes. They are also assumed to move 
between the same different occurrences of market sizes. But this is questionable as 
we can see from Table 3.1. The city pair Oslo-Bergen had approximately 1.6 million 
passengers in 2007, while the city pair Tromsø-Bodø had approximately 160 
thousand passengers in the same year. We can’t expect these two markets to move 
between the same states at the same probability. It is for example unlikely that the 
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city pair Oslo-Bergen becomes ten times smaller relatively to the other city pairs in 
the near future. An extension to the model would be to allow the different markets to 
have their own set of transition probabilities. In that way, we could keep the same 
amount of state occurrences but alter the probability that one city pair reaches this 
state compared to another. This will be more realistic but much harder 
computationally. Only for the nineteen markets, it would mean nineteen different 
transition probability matrices instead of one. In order to create those matrices 
correctly, we would as well need to study the industry even more extensively, to 
discover annual variations in the sizes of the city pairs. 
Lastly, it is possible to extent the model in order to include demand shocks. 
Seasonal effect in demand for air transport is a well known fact, and is poorly 
pictured here. 
We believe the model performs well, despite the limitations we point out. The 
results produced by the simulations, seem to be in accordance with industrial 
organization theory. In that respect the framework is valuable and can thus be used to 
study other industries with global player firms. A similar framework can also be built 
for the local player case and may provide important insight on entry processes in 
oligopoly markets with product differentiation. 
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Appendix 
 
 Appendix A 
 
We will take a moment and show how the expression (3.25) is reached with 
help from the literature (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007, p 12). We start from (3.24). 
The vector  consists of the rows . 
 
 
 
From the properties of the normal distribution, we can assume from symmetry, that 
. 
 
 
 
We observe that . 
Hence we can conclude the following. 
 
 
 
We can thus see that  consists of the rows . 
QED. 
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 Appendix B 
 
Algorithm for global players 
 
o Define the parameters n, , , ,  and  
o Define the state space , and build the transition probability 
  
o Initialize  
o Initiate a loop over  
(2.16) 
o Given , construct the conditional choice probabilities 
  and  
o Construct the profit function  
(The log-linear version of (3.17) is used here) 
o Introduce the value function  of the n firms 
(2.15) 
o Update the choice probabilities 
o Iterate until , where  is the convergence criterion. 
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 Appendix C 
 
In the second part of our thesis we presented the global player as well as the 
local player model. We went through the numerical analysis of the global player 
model in the third part, but time didn’t permit us to go through the same analysis for 
the local player model. We will nevertheless examine how we can simulate this 
model on Matlab by presenting the algorithm. 
 
Algorithm for local players 
 
o Define the parameters , , , , , , , , , , , 
 and . 
o Define the state space , and build the transition probabilities 
 and  
o Construct the profit structure 
 (2.20), (2.23), (2.24) and (2.27) 
o Introduce the initial choice probabilities 
, ,  and , respectively (2.35), (2.39), (2.40) and (2.42) 
o Initialize  and  
o Initiate a loop over   
o Compute  
o Compute the number of incumbents for the period at hand as well as the 
transition probability  
o Construct the value function of the firms 
 and  
o Update the choice probabilities 
o Iterate until , where  is the convergence criterion. 
 
 
